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THE RIGHT OF CONFRONTATION 
Part I 
Paul C. Giannelli 
Professor of Law 
Case Western Reserve University 
The Sixth Amendment provides that "[i]n crimi-
nal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right 
... to be confronted with the witnesses against 
him." This clause was held binding upon the 
states in Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400 (1965). In 
addition, the right of confrontation is recognized in 
virtually all state constitutions. See 5 J. Wigmore, 
Evidence§ 1397 (Chadbourn rev. 1974) (listing 
authorities). For example, the Ohio Constitution 
provides: "In any trial, in any court, the party ac-
cused shall be allowed to appear and defend in 
person ... [and] to meet the witnesses face to 
face .... " The Ohio Supreme Court, however, has 
shown no inclination to interpret the Ohio provi-
sion so as to afford greater confrontation protec-
tion than that required by the Sixth Amendment. t See State v. Spikes, 67 Ohio St.2d 405, 423 N.E.2d 
1122 (1981); State v. Madison, 64 Ohio St.2d 322, 
415 N.E.2d 272 (1980). 
The U.S. Supreme Court has underscored the im-
portance of the Confrontation Clause on numerous 
occasions. In an early case, Kirby v. U.S., 174 U.S. 
47 (1899), the Court referred to the confrontation 
clause as "[o]ne of the fundamental guarantees of 
life and liberty ... long deemed so essential for 
the due protection of life and liberty that it is 
guarded against legislative and judicial action by 
provisions in the Constitution of the United States 
and in the constitutions of most if not all the 
States composing the Union." /d. at 55-56. See al-
so Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 405 (1965) ("There 
are few subjects, perhaps, upon which this Court 
and other courts have been more nearly unani-
mous than in their expressions of belief that the 
right of confrontation and cross-examination is an 
essential and fundamental requirement for the 
kind of fair trial which is this country's constitu-
tional goal."). Because the right of confrontation is 
considered such a fundamental right, it has often 
been applied as an element of due process in 
noncriminal proceedings. See In re Gault, 387 U.S. 
1 (1967) (juvenile delinquency adjudicatory hear-
ings); Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970) (welfare 
termination hearings); Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 
U.S. 471 (1972) (parole revocation hearings; condi-
tional right of confrontation); Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 
411 U.S. 778 (1973) (probation revocation hearings; 
conditional right); Willner v. Committee on 
Character & Fitness, 373 U.S. 96 (1963) (denial of 
admission to bar); Greene v. McElroy, 360 U.S. 474 
(1959) (security clearance revocation). 
Notwithstanding the recognized importance of 
the Confrontation Clause, its scope as well as the 
values it seeks to protect remain subject to de-
bate. This result is probably attributable to two 
factors. First, as Justice Harlan has pointed out, 
"the Confrontation Clause comes to us on faded 
parchment. History seems to give us very little in-
sight into the intended scope of the Sixth Amend-
ment Confrontation Clause," California v. Green, 
399 U.S. 149, 173-74 (1970) (concurring opinion). 
See also Graham, The Right of Confrontation and 
the Hearsay Rule: Sir Walter Raleigh Loses 
Another One, 8 Grim. L. Bull. 99, 104 (1972) ("The 
historical approach is peculiarly difficult as ap-
plied to the Sixth Amendment because a satisfac-
tory history of the right of confrontation has yet to 
be written."). Second, the Supreme Court has only 
recently ventured into this area. The Court "decid-
ed its first confrontation case a century after the 
Sixth Amendment was adopted." /d. Moreover, the 
Court had little need to develop a comprehensive 
view of the right of confrontation prior to 1965, 
when the right was first applied to state trials in 
Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400 (1965). Prior to that 
time, the Court could resolve most "confrontation" 
issues on federal evidentiary grounds. 
This article will examine the current status of 
the Confrontation Clause. The first part of the arti-
cle considers the "right to be present," the right of 
cross-examination, and Bruton issues. The second 
part discusses the relationship between the right 
of confrontation and the hearsay rule. 
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PRESENCE AT TRIAL 
"One of the most basic of the rights guaranteed 
by the Confrontation Clause is the accused's right 
to be present in the courtroom at every stage of 
his trial." Illinois v. Allen, 397 U.S. 337, 338 (1970); 
accord, In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257 (1948); Lewis v. 
U.S., 146 U.S. 370, 372 (1892) ("A leading principle 
that pervades the entire law of criminal procedure 
is that, after indictment found, nothing shall be 
done in the absence of the prisoner."). See also 
Westen, Confrontation and Compulsory Process: A 
Unified Theory of Evidence for Criminal Cases, 91 
Harv. L. Rev. 567, 569-74 (1978). Thus, it is a viola-
tion of the right of confrontation for the defendant 
to be absent during challenges to the jury, lewis v. 
U.S., 146 U.S. 370 (1892), during the introduction of 
evidence, In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 370 (1948), and 
when additional jury instructions are given, State 
v. Grisafulli, 135 Ohio St. 87, 19 N.E.2d 645 (1939); 
Jones v. State, 26 Ohio St. 208 (1875). 
A recent case involving the right to be present is 
U.S. v. Benefield, 593 F.2d 815 (8th Cir. 1979). In 
Benefield a videotape deposition of the prosecu-
tion's principal witness, a kidnap victim, was taken 
prior to trial. The deposition was used because the 
witness' psychiatrist testified that her "psychiatric 
problems were directly related to her abduction. 
He recommended that she not be required to testi-
fy or that circumstances less stressful than a trial 
courtroom be arranged." /d. at 817. The defendant 
was excluded from the room in which the deposi-
tion was taken, although he did observe the pro-
ceedings on a monitor and could interrupt the pro-
ceedings by using a buzzer, at which time his 
counsel could consult with him. The Eighth Circuit 
found this procedure infringed the defendant's 
right of confrontation: 
Basically the confrontation clause contemplates the 
active participation of the accused at all stages of the 
trial, including the face-to-face meeting with the wit-
ness at trial or, at the minimum, in a deposition allow-
ing the accused to face the witness, assist his coun-
sel, and participate in the questioning through his 
counsel. /d. at 821. 
See also State v. Wilkinson, 64 Ohio St.2d 308, 415 
N.E.2d 261 (1980); Criminal Defendant Has Sixth 
Amendment Right to Physically Confr..ont Witness 
at Video-Taped Deposition, 1979 Wash. U.L.Q. 
1106. 
Waiver 
The right to be present at trial may be waived, 
either expressly or by conduct. In Illinois v. Allen, 
397 U.S. 337 (1970), the Supreme Court held that a 
defendant who disrupts a trial, making it "difficult 
or wholly impossible to carry on the trial," may be 
excluded, after warning, from the courtroom. Simil-
arly, in Taylor v. U.S., 414 U.S. 17 (1973), the Court 
held that a defendant who voluntarily absented 
himself from his trial during a recess had waived 
his right to be present. See also Diaz v. U.S., 223 
u.s. 442 (1912). 
In Taylor the defendant argued that a voluntary 
absence cannot be construed as an effective waiv-
er because it was not "an intentional relinquish-
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ment or abandonment of a known right or privi-
lege." /d. at 19, quoting Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 
458 (1938). The court rejected this argument, which 
would have required a defendant to have been ad-
vised in advance of the consequences of absent-
ing himself from trial. According to the Court, "[i]t 
is wholly incredible to suggest that petitioner ... 
entertained any doubts about his right to be pre-
sent at every stage of his trial." /d. at 20. 
Several courts have also found a "waiver" where 
the defendant absents himself prtor to trial but af-
ter arraignment. See U.S. v. Peterson, 524 F.2d 167 
(4th Cir. 1975). cert. denied sub. nom., Smith v. 
U.S., 424 U.S. 925 (1976); U.S. v. Tortora, 464 F.2d 
1202 (2d Cir. 1972), cert. denied sub. nom., Santora 
v. U.S., 409 U.S.1063 (1972). 
The right to be present has been codified in Fed-
eral Criminal Rule 43 and Ohio Criminal Rule 43. 
See generally BB Moore's Federal Practice ch. 43 
(1981); 2 0. Schroeder & L. Katz, Ohio Criminal 
Law, Grim. R. 43 (1980). See also R.C. 2945.16 
(right to be present at jury view); Grim. R. 15 (right 
to be present at deposition). 
RIGHT OF CROSS-EXAMINATION 
In addition to ensuring a defendant's right to be 
present, the Confrontation Clause guarantees the 
defendant the right to cross-examine the "witness-
es against him." See Douglas v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 
415, 418 (1965) ("Our cases construing the [Con-
frontation] clause hold that a primary interest se-
cured by it is the right of cross-examination."). 
Brookhart v. Janis, 384 U.S. 1, 3 (1966) ("a denial of 
cross-examination without a waiver ... would be 
constitutional error of the first magnitude and no 
amount of showing of want of prejudice would 
cure it."). 
Denial of Right to Cross-Examine 
The Supreme Court has reviewed several cases 
in which it has found a complete denial of the 
right of cross-examination. For example, in 
Douglas v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 415 (1965), the pro-
secution called a previously-convicted accomplice 
as a witness. When the witness refused to testify, 
asserting the privilege against self-incrimination, 
the prosecutor read the witness' prior confession 
which implicated the defendant, under the guise of 
refreshing the witness' recollection. The Supreme 
Court reversed. 
In the circumstances of this case, [the defendant's] in-
ability to cross-examine [the witness] as to the alleged 
confession plainly denied him the right of cross-exam-
ination secured by the Confrontation Clause .... Al-
though the Solicitor's reading of [the witness'] alleged 
statement, and [the witness'] refusal to answer, were 
not technically testimony, the Solicitor's reading may 
well have been the equivalent in the jury's mind of 
testimony that [the witness] in fact made the state-
ment. .. /d. at 419. 
See also State v. Liberatore, 69 Ohio St.2d 583 
(1982). 
A similar denial of cross-examination is found in 
joint trials in which one defendant's confession 
implicating a codefendant is admitted. Although 
the codefendant would be entitled to an instruc-
tion cautioning the jury to use the confession only 
in establishing the guilt of the defendant who 
made the confession, the Supreme Court has held 
that such an instruction is ineffective, and conse-
,- quently, the non-confessing defendant's right of 
confrontation is denied - at least, where the con-
fessing defendant does not take the stand. Bruton 
v. U.S., 391 U.S. 123 (1968); Nelson v. O'Neil, 402 
U.S. 622 (1971); but see, Parker v. Randolph, 442 
U.S. 62 (1979) (plurality opinion) (interlocking con-
fessions). See infra. 
Parker v. Gladden, 385 U.S. 363 (1966), illustrates 
another way in which a defendant's right of cross-
examination may be denied. In Parker a bailiff 
assigned to a sequestered jury told one juror "Oh 
that wicked fellow, he is guilty" and another juror 
"[i]f anything is wrong (in finding petitioner guilty) 
the Supreme Court will correct it." /d. at 363-64. 
The Supreme Court reversed, finding a violation of 
the right of confrontation. 
These cases can also be viewed as "hearsay" 
cases because they involve extrajudicial state-
ments that the jury probably used for the truth of 
the assertions. Indeed, the Supreme Court has 
often relied on these cases in deciding hearsay-
confrontation issues. On the other hand, these 
cases can also be viewed as "nonevidence" cases, 
situations in which the jury may have decided the 
case on evidence that was not admitted at trial. 
See Graham, The Right of Confrontation and the 
Hearsay Rule: Sir Walter Raleigh Loses Another 
~One, 8 Grim. L. Bull. 99 (1972). 
· Curtailment of Cross-Examination 
Cases recognizing a trial court's discretion in 
controlling the scope of cross-examination are 
common. E.g., O'Brien v. Angley, 63 Ohio St.2d 
159, 163, 407 N.E.2d 490, 493 (1980) ("The scope of 
cross-examination and the admissibility of evi-
dence during cross-examination are matters which 
rest in the sound discretion of the trial judge."); 
State v. Walker, 55 Ohio St.2d 208, 214, 378 N.E.2d 
1049, 1052 (1978), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 924 (1979) 
("The trial judge is posited with broad discretion in 
controlling cross-examination .... ") 
Nevertheless, there are a number of cases in 
which the Supreme Court has ruled that a defense 
counsel's cross-examination of prosecution wit-
nesses had been unconstitutionally curtailed. The 
leading case is Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308 (1974). 
Because of a state statute protecting the confiden-
tiality of juvenile adjudications, the defense in 
Davis was not permitted to elicit information about 
a key government witness' juvenile probationary 
status during cross-examination. According io ihe 
defense, the witness' probationary status raised 
the possibility of bias; that is, the witness was 
"subject to undue pressure from the police and 
made his identifications[of the defendant] under 
jJear of possible probation revocation." /d. at 311. 
"In an opinion written by Chief Justice Burger, the 
,Court held that this restriction on the scope of 
cross-examination violated the defendant's right of 
Confrontation. Although the Court recognized the 
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legitimacy of the state's protective policy concern-
ing juveniles, the Court found that the "State's 
policy interest in protecting the confidentiality of a 
juvenile offender's record cannot require yielding 
of so vital a constitutional right as the effective 
cross-examination for bias of an adverse witness." 
/d. at 320. 
The Court had addressed similar issues in two 
earlier cases. In Smith v. Illinois, 390 U.S. 129 
(1968), the defense was precluded from eliciting 
the true name and address of the prosecution's 
"principal witness" during cross-examination. The 
Court held that this limitation on cross-examin-
ation deprived the defendant of the right of con-
frontation. "To forbid this most rudimentary inquiry 
at the threshold is effectively to emasculate the 
right of cross-examination itself." /d. at 131. In 
reaching its decision, the Court relied heavily on 
Alford v. U.S., 282 U.S. 687 (1931), decided almost 
forty years earlier. As in Smith, the defense in 
Alford was not permitted to examine a government 
witness about the witness' current residence. The 
Court held that this curtailment of cross-examin-
ation, which would have apparently established 
that the witness was in federal custody, was an 
abuse of discretion and prejudicial error. 
See also State v. Faulkner, 56 Ohio St.2d 42, 46, 
381 N.E.2d 934, 936 (1978) ("a defendant must have 
the opportunity to cross-examine all witnesses 
against him as a matter of right ... ");State v. 
Hannah, 54 Ohio St.2d 84, 88, 374 N.E.2d 1359, 
1362 (1978) ("Any abrogation of the defendant's 
right to a full and complete cross-examination of 
such witnesses is a denial of a fundamental right 
essential to a fair trial and is prejudicial per se."); 
State v. Gavin, 51 Ohio App.2d 49, 365 N.E.2d 1263 
(1977). 
Fifth Amendment Limitations 
Cross-examination may be limited or completely 
cut off if a prosecution witness asserts the Fifth 
Amendment privilege against self-incrimination. 
Under these curcuinstances, the defendant's right 
of confrontation conflicts with the witness' Fifth 
Amendment right. If the asseriion of the privilege 
"precludes inquiry into the details of [the witness'] 
direct testimony, there may be a substantial dan-
ger of prejudice because the defense is deprived 
of the right to test the truth of his direct testimony 
and, therefore, that witness' testimony should be 
struck in whole or in part." U.S. v. Cardillo, 316 
F.2d 606, 611 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 822 
(1963); accord, U.S. v. Demchak, 545 F.2d 1029, 
1031 (5th Cir. 1977); U.S. v. Newman, 490 F.2d 139, 
145-46 (3d Cir. 1974). See also Douglas v. Alabama, 
380 u.s. 415 (1965). 
Striking the direct examination, however, is not 
automatic. The courts have recognized a distinc-
tion between "direct" and "collateral" matters. 
In determining whether the testimony of a witness 
who invokes the privilege against self-incrimination 
during cross-examination may be used against the 
defendant, a distinction must be drawn between 
cases in which the assertion of the privilege merely 
precludes inquiry into collateral matters which bear 
only on the credibility of the witness and those cases 
in which the assertion of the privilege prevents inquiry 
into matters about which the witness testified on di-
rect examination. U.S. v. Cardillo, 316 F.2d 606, 611 
(2nd Cir.), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 822 (1963). 
Accord, U.S. v. Williams, 626 F.2d 697, 701-02 (9th 
Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1020 (1980); Turner v. 
Fair, 617 F.2d 7, 9-11 (1st Cir. 1980). See also 3 D. 
Louisell & C. Mueller, Federal Evidence § 338 
(1979); Anno., 55 A.L.R. Fed. 742 (1981). 
The direct-collateral dichotomy, however, is an 
"often tenuous distinction." 3 J. Weinstein & M. 
Berger, Weinstein's Evidence 611-54 (1981). As one 
court has noted: 
But the line between "direct" and "collateral" is not 
clear, and the question in each case must finally be 
whether defendant's inability to make the inquiry 
created a substantial danger of prejudice by depriving 
him of the ability to test the truth of the witness' 
direct testimony. Fountain v. U.S., 384 F.2d 624, 628 
(5th Cir.), cert. denied sub. nom. Marshall v. U.S. 390 
U.S. 1005 (1968). 
Davis v. Alaska would seem to preclude the 
possibility of equating "collateral" matters with 
matters of credibility because Davis involved im-
peachment by bias, a matter of credibility. See 
U.S. v. Diecidue, 603 F.2d 535 (5th Cir. 1979), cert. 
denied sub. nom. Antone v. U.S., 445 U.S. 946 
(1980) (bias not a collateral matter). 
Another solution to the conflict between the 
defendant's right of confrontation and the witness' 
privilege against compulsory self-incrimination is 
the immunization of the witness. See Note, "The 
Public Has a Claim to Every Man's Evidence": The 
Defendant's Constitutional Right to Witness Immu-
nity, 30 Stan. L. Rev. 1211, 1228-30 (1978). There is 
some judicial support for requiring immunity in sit-
uations in which a witness' Fifth Amendment 
claim interferes with an accused's ability to de-
fend. See Government of Virgin Islands v. Smith, 
615 F.2d 964 (3d Cir. 1980); U.S. v. Yates, 524 F.2d 
1282, 1286 (D.C. Cir. 1975); State v. Broady, 41 Ohio 
App.2d 17, 321 N.E.2d 891 (1974). See generally 
Note, The Sixth Amendment Right to Have Use Im-
munity Granted to Defense Witnesses, 91 Harv. L. 
Rev. 1266 (1978); Comment, Defense Witness Im-
munity and the Right to a Fair Trial, 129 U. Pa. L. 
Rev. 377 (1980). 
Rape Shield Laws 
In recent years, most jurisdictions have adopted 
rape shield laws. See Tanford & Bocchino, Rape 
Victim Shield Laws and the Sixth Amendment, 128 
U. Pa. L. Rev. 544, 592-602 (1980) (listing 46 jurisdic-
tions). The purpose of these provisions is to pro-
tect the privacy of rape victims. This goal is 
accomplished by altering the common law rule 
which permitted the accused to introduce evidence 
of the victim's character for chastity on the issue 
of consent. See McDermott v. State, 13 Ohio St. 
332 (1862); McCombs v. State, 8 Ohio St. 643 (1858.) 
Instead of permitting the automatic admission of 
such evidence, shield laws place both substantive 
and procedural limitations on the admissibility of 
evidence of a victim's prior sexual history. 
Because these provisions may curtail a defen-
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dant's right to cross-examine the alleged victim 
and limit the admissibility of exculpatory evidence, 
a number of commentators have questioned the 
constitutionality of shield provisions-at least as 
applied in some circumstances. See Tanford & 
Bocchino, Rape Victim Shield Laws and the Sixth 
Amendment, 128 U. Pa. L. Rev. 544 (1980); Berger, 
Man's Trial, Woman's Tribulation: Rape Cases in 
the Courtroom, 77 Colum. L. Rev. 1, 52-69 (1977); 
Westen, Compulsory Process 1/, 74 Mich. L. Rev. 
191, 208-213 (1975). Indeed, the federal shield stat-
ute explicitly recognizes that the admissibility of 
evidence of a victim's prior sexual activity may be 
"constitutionally required," Fed. R. Evid. 412(b)(1). 
Constitutional attacks on the rcipe shield stat-
utes center on two Supreme Court cases. One is 
Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308 (1974). As discussed 
above, the Court in Davis held that a statute ex-
cluding evidence of a prosecution witness' juvenile 
adjudication (a type of shield law) violated the de-
fendant's right of confrontation. 
The second Supreme Court case is Chambers v. 
Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284 (1973), in which the de-
fendant was charged with the murder of a police-
man. Another person, named McDonald, signed a 
statement admitting that it was he, not Chambers, 
who fired the fatal shots. McDonald made the 
same admission to three other persons. At a pre-
liminary examination McDonald recanted, testify-
ing that he had been pressured into signing the 
statement. McDonald was called by the defense at 
Chambers' trial and his out-of-court confession 
was introduced on direct examination. On cross-
examination, the prosecution elicited the fact that 
McDonald had recanted. On redirect examination, 
the defense wanted to cross-examine McDonald as 
an adverse witness. The trial court refused to de-
clare him as adverse witness. The court also ruled 
that the defense could not introduce McDonald's 
incriminating statements made to the three other 
persons. The court's rulings were based upon two 
evidentiary rules:. the voucher rule, which pre-
cludes a party from impeaching its own witnesses, 
and the hearsay rule, which did not recognize an 
exception for declarations against penal interests. 
As the Court put it "In sum, then, this was Cham-
bers' predicament. As a consequence of the com-
bination of Mississippi's 'party witness' or 'vouch-
er rule' and its hearsay rule, he was unable to 
either cross-examine McDonald or to present wit-
nesses in his own behalf who would have discred-
ited McDonald's repudiation and demonstrated his 
complicity." /d. at 294. The Court reversed, finding 
a due process violation. Part of the Court's opinion 
rested on a confrontation analysis- that the 
state's voucher rule precluded Chambers from 
effectively cross-examining McDonald. Thus, like 
Davis v. Alaska, Chambers can be viewed as a 
case in which the Confrontation Clause prevailed 
over a conflicting state evidentiary rule. 
Despite these constitutional arguments, shield 
laws generally have been upheld. See Bell v. Har-
rison, 670 F.2d 656 (6th Cir. 1982); Pratt v. Parratt, 
615 F.2d 486, 487 (8th Cir. 1980); Rozell v. Estelle, 
554 F.2d 229 (5th Cir. 1977); 23 C. Wright & K. 
Graham, Federal Practice and Procedure 571 n. 53 
(1980) (listing cases). Nevertheless, most commen-
tators believe that "exclusion may violate the 
defendant's constitutional rights as applied in par-
-- ticular circumstances." !d. at 572. For example, in 
' State v. Gardner, 59 Ohio St.2d 14, 391 N.E.2d 337 
(1979), the Ohio Supreme Court upheld the consti-
tutionality of the Ohio rape shield statute as ap-
plied to that case. In a footnote, however, the 
Court noted: "We hasten to stress that our holding 
is limited to the particular application of R.C. 
2907.02(D) to the facts in this case. Whether the 
statute could conceivably be applied so as to ex-
clude arguably relevant evidence, we cannot now 
determine." !d. at 19 n. 2. 
A few courts have found a constitutional viola-
tion where evidence of the alleged victim's prior 
sexual history has been excluded. For example, in 
State v. Delawder, 28 Md. App. 212, 344 A.2d 446 
(1975), the defense's theory was that the alleged 
victfm, a young teenager, fabricated her testimony 
about having intercourse with the defendant be-
cause she believed that she was pregnant and was 
afraid to inform her mother of this fact. The court, 
applying Davis v. Alaska, held that the defendant's 
right of confrontation had been denied when the 
trial court precluded the defense from introducing 
evidence of the alleged victim's past sexual his-
tory to support this theory. See also State v. Jalo, 
27 Or. App. 845, 557 P.2d 1359 (1976); People v. 
Mandel, 61 App. Div.2d 563, 403 N.Y.S.2d 63 (1978). 
Other Privileges 
Whether the right of confrontation may override 
other state evidentiary privileges is a matter of 
debate. See Hill, Testimonial Privilege and Fair 
Trial, 80 Colum. L. Rev. 1173 (1980); Westen, Re-
flections on Alfred Hill's "Testimonial Privilege 
and Fair Trial," 14 U. Mich. J. L. Reform 372 (1981). 
Again, Davis v. Alaska, in which the Court held 
that the defendant's right of confrontation prevail-
ed over the privilege of confidentiality of juvenile 
court records, is the critical case. Moreover, United 
States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 (1974), co,ntains dic-
tum indicating that the Sixth Amendment, under 
some circumstances, overrides executive privilege. 
!d. at 711. 
In several cases courts have held that the right 
of confrontation prevails over conflicting statutory 
privileges. For example, in Salazar v. State, 559 
P.2d 66 (Alas. 1976), the Alaska Supreme Court 
held that the right of confrontation overrode the 
privilege for confidential communications between 
husband and wife. Similarly, in State v. Hembd, 
305 Minn. 120, 232 N.W.2d 872 (1975), the Minne-
sota Supreme Court held the right of confrontation 
prevailed over the physician-patient privilege. See 
also People v. Sumpter, 75 Misc.2d 55, 347 
N.Y.S.2d 670 (Sup. Ct. 1973) (Sixth Amendment 
Prevails over confidentiality of state agency's per-
sonnel files.); Note, Constitutional Restraints on 
the Exclusion of Evidence in the Defendant's Fa-
vor: The Implications of Davis v. Alaska, 73 Mich. 
L. Rev. 1465 (1975); Note, Defendant v. Witness: 
Measuring Confrontation and Compulsory Process 
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Rights Against Statutory Communications Privi-
leges, 30 Stan. L. Rev. 935 (1978). 
Waiver 
In Brookhart v. Janis, 384 U.S. 1 (1966), the 
Supreme Court considered the standard for deter-
mining a waiver of the right of confrontation and 
cross-examination. In Brookhart the defendant's 
counsel agreed to a procedure that is described as 
a "prima facie trial;" that is, he "agreed that the 
state need make only a prima facie showing of 
guilt and that he would neither offer evidence on 
petitioner's behalf nor cross-examine any State's 
witnesses." !d. at 7. The record indicated that the 
defendant did not fully comprehend what a "prima 
facie trial" entailed. In reversing, the Supreme 
Court wrote: 
The question of a waiver of a federally guaranteed 
constitutional right is, of course, a federal question 
controlled by federal law. There is a presumption 
against the waiver of constiutional rights ... and for a 
waiver to be effective it must be clearly established 
that there was "an intentional relinquishment or aban-
donment of a known right or privilege." Johnson v. 
Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458 .... /d. at 4. 
The Court went on to find that the defendant 
neither personally waived his constitutional right 
to confront and cross-examine the witnesses 
against him, nor acquiesced in his lawyer's at-
tempted waiver. The waiver standard adopted in 
Brookhart is a more stringent standard than the 
one adopted by the Court in the "right to be present" 
cases. See supra. 
BRUTON V. UNITED STATES 
Because the Supreme Court has decided a num-
ber of cases involving "Bruton" issues, this sub-
ject is treated separately in this section. In Bruton 
v. U.S., 391 U.S. 123 (1968), the Court considered 
the admissibility in a joint trial of the confession 
of one defendant that inculpated another defend-
ant. In such a situation, the non-confessing de-
fendant is entitled to a limiting instruction, cau-
tioning the jury to use the confession in determin-
ing only the guilt of the confessing party. Prior to 
Bruton, the Court had held that such an instruction 
was adequate to protect the non-confessing code-
fendant. Delli Paoli v. U.S., 352 U.S. 232 (1957). In 
Bruton, however, the Court held that the limiting 
instruction was not sufficient. According to the 
Court, 
there are some contexts in which the risk that the jury 
will not, or cannot, follow instructions is so great, and 
the consequences of failure so vital to the defendant, 
that the practical and human limitations of the jury 
system cannot be ignored .... Such a context is pre-
sented here, where the powerfully incriminating extra-
judicial statements of a codefendant, who stands ac-
cused side-by-side with the defendant, are deliberately 
spread before the jury in a joint trial. 391 U.S. at 
135-36. 
Once the Court concluded that there existed a 
"substantial risk that the jury, despite instructions 
to the contrary, looked to the incriminating extra-
judicial statements in determining the petitioner's 
guilt," it held that the admission of the nontestify-
ing codefendant's "confession in this joint trial 
violated petitioner's right of cross-examination 
secured by the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth 
Amendment." /d. at 126. 
In subsequent decisions, the Court held Bruton 
applicable to state trials, Roberts v. Russell, 392 
U.S. 293 (1968), and subject to the harmless error 
doctrine, Harrington v. California, 395 U.S. 250 
(1969); Schneble v. Florida, 405 U.S. 427 (1972); 
Brown v. U.S., 411 U.S. 223 (1973). See also State v. 
Moritz, 63 Ohio St.2d 150, 407 N.E.2d 1268 (1980). 
Applicability of Bruton 
There are a number of situations in which 
Bruton does not apply. First, Bruton applies only 
when the codefendant's confession is not admis-
sible against the non-confessing defendant. In a 
footnote in Bruton the Court pointed out this 
limitation: "We emphasize that the hearsay state-
ment inculpating petitioner was clearly inadmissi-
ble against him under traditional rules of evidence 
.... There is not before us, therefore, any recog-
nized exception to the hearsay rule insofar as peti-
tioner is concerned and we intimate no view what-
ever that such exceptions necessarily raise ques-
tions under the Confrontation Clause." /d. at 128 n. 
3. Thus, if the confession falls within a recognized 
hearsay exception, such as the coconspirator ex-
ception, see Fed. R. Evid. 801(d)(2)(E); Ohio R. Evid. 
801(D)(2)(e), Bruton would not apply. In such a case 
the confrontation issue is analyzed under a differ-
ent standard. See infra (hearsay). 
Second, the Bruton rationale would not appear 
to apply to bench trials. See U.S. v. Pinkney, 611 
F.2d 176, 178 (7th Cir. 1979); Cockrell v. Ober-
hauser, 413 F.2d 256 (9th Cir. 1969). Nevertheless, 
if in a bench trial the court does, in fact, use the 
confession in determining the guilt of the non-con-
fessing defendant, Bruton applies. See U.S. v. 
· Longee, 603 F.2d 1342, 1345 (9th Cir. 1979). 
Third, if the codefendant testifies at trial, Bruton 
does not apply. In Bruton the codefendant did not 
testify. See 391 U.S. 136 ("The unreliability of such 
evidence is intolerably compounded when the al-
leged accomplice, as here, does not testify and 
cannot be tested by cross-examination."). If the co-
defendant testifies, however, the defendant has 
the opportunity to cross-examine the codefendant, 
thereby obviating the confrontation issue. The 
Supreme Court took this position in Nelson v. 
O'Neil, 402 U.S. 622 (1971). See also State v. Doher-
ty, 56 Ohio App.2d 112, 381 N.E. 2d 960 (1978). The 
Nelson rationale is inapplicable where both de-
fendants are represented by the same attorney be-
cause in such a case cross-examination of the tes-
tifying codefendant would present a conflict of in-
terests. See Courtney v. U.S., 486 F.2d 1108 (9th 
Cir. 1973); Holland v. Henderson, 460 F.2d 978 (5th 
Cir. 1972). 
Fourth, there is authority for the proposition that 
Bruton is inapplicable when both defendants have 
confessed, implicating each other ("interlocking 
confessions."). The Court considered, but did not 
resolve, this issue in Parker v. Randolph, 442 U.S. 
62 (1979). The plurality opinion in Parker took the 
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position that Bruton was not applicable to cases 
involving interlocking confessions. Only four Jus-
tices, however, joined in that position. Justice 
Blackmun concurred on harmless error grounds 
and Justice Powell did not participate in the deci-
sion. The lower courts have split on the issue. See 
id. at 68 n. 4 (listing cases). 
Bruton could apply, however, to statements 
made by a codefendant in a pro se argument to a 
jury. U.S. v. Sacco, 563 F.2d 552 (2d Cir. 1977). 
Avoiding the Bruton Issue 
There are several ways in which the Bruton 
issue may be obviated. Separate trials avoid the 
problem raised in Bruton because the codefend-
ant's confession would be inadmissible hearsay in 
the trial of the non-confessing defendant. Fre-
quently, a motion to sever is based on this ground. 
See generally State v. Moritz, 63 Ohio St.2d 150, 
407 N.E.2d 1268 (1980); 8 Moore's Federal Practice 
ch. 14 (1978); 2 0. Schroeder & L. Katz, Ohio Crim-
inal Law, Grim. 14 (1980). 
Another way to avoid the Bruton issue is to 
delete or redact all references in the confession 
that relate to the codefendant. The Bruton Court 
recognized this possibility. See 391 U.S. at 134 
n.10. See also State v. Rosen, 151 Ohio St. 339, 
342, 86 N.E.2d 24, 26 (1949). This procedure is not 
effective in many cases "since other testimony in 
the case may lead any juror inevitably to the con-
clusion that omitted names in the statement can 
only be the names of other codefendants sitting at 
the defense table." 1 D. Louisell & C. Mueller, 
Federal Evidence 337 (1977). See also Parker v. 
Randolph, 422 U.S. 62, 67 n. 3 (1979); Hodges v. 
Rose, 570 F.2d 643 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 436 U.S. 
909 (1978). Thus, the California Supreme Court has 
remarked: "By effective deletions, we mean not 
only direct and indirect identifications of code-
fendants but any statements that could be employ-
ed against nondeclarant codefendants once their 
identity is otherwise established." People v. 
Aranda, 63 Cal.2d 518, 530, 407 P.2d 265, 273, 47 
Cal. Rptr. 353, 361 (1965). In addition, "the confess-
ing defendant may himself object to redaction, in-
voking the 'rule of completeness' and urging that 
deletions from his statement as read or presented 
to the jury distort the meaning of the portion of-
fered in evidence." 1 D. Louisell & C. Mueller, 
supra, at 337-38. 
Another remedy for avoiding Bruton is the em-
paneling of two juries, with only the appropriate 
jury present at the time the codefendant's confes-
sion is received. See U.S. v. Rimar, 558 F.2d 1271, 
1273 (6th Cir. 1977); U.S. v. Rowan, 518 F.2d 685, 
690 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, sub. noin. Jackson v. 
U.S., 423 U.S. 949 (1975); U.S. v. Sidman, 470 F.2d 
1158, 1167-70 (9th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 
1127 (1973). 
See generally 21 C. Wright & K. Graham, Federal 
Practice and Procedure§ 5064 (1977); 1 J. Wein-
stein & M. Berger, Weinstein's Evidence ~105[04] 
(1981); Marcus, The Confrontation Clause and Co-
defendants Confessions: The Drift from Bruton to 
Parker v. Randolph, 1979 U.lll. L.F. 559. 
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THE RIGHT OF CONFRONTATION 
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The Sixth Amendment provides that "[i]n crimi-
nal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right 
... to be confronted with the witnesses against 
him." This clause was held binding upon the 
states in Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400 (1965). In 
addition, the right of confrontation is recognized in 
virtually all state constitutions. See 5 J. Wigmore, 
Evidence§ 1397 (Chadbourn rev. 1974) (listing 
authorities). For example, the Ohio Constitution 
provides: "In any trial, in any court, the party ac-
cused shall be allowed to appear and defend in 
person ... [and] to meet the witnesses face to 
face .... " The Ohio Supreme Court, however, has 
shown no inclination to interpret the Ohio provi-
sion so as to afford greater confrontation protec-
tion than that required by the Sixth Amendment. t See State v. Spikes, 67 Ohio St.2d 405, 423 N.E.2d 
1122 (1981); State v. Madison, 64 Ohio St.2d 322, 
415 N.E.2d 272 (1980). 
The U.S. Supreme Court has underscored the im-
portance of the Confrontation Clause on numerous 
occasions. In an early case, Kirby v. U.S., 174 U.S. 
47 (1899), the Court referred to the confrontation 
clause as "[o]ne of the fundamental guarantees of 
life and liberty ... long deemed so essential for 
the due protection of life and liberty that it is 
guarded against legislative and judicial action by 
provisions in the Constitution of the United States 
and in the constitutions of most if not all the 
States composing the Union." /d. at 55-56. See al-
so Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 405 (1965) ("There 
are few subjects, perhaps, upon which this Court 
and other courts have been more nearly unani-
mous than in their expressions of belief that the 
right of confrontation and cross-examination is an 
essential and fundamental requirement for the 
kind of fair trial which is this country's constitu-
tional goal."). Because the right of confrontation is 
considered such a fundamental right, it has often 
been applied as an element of due process in 
noncriminal proceedings. See In re Gault, 387 U.S. 
1 (1967) (juvenile delinquency adjudicatory hear-
ings); Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970) (welfare 
termination hearings); Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 
U.S. 471 (1972) (parole revocation hearings; condi-
tional right of confrontation); Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 
411 U.S. 778 (1973) (probation revocation hearings; 
conditional right); Willner v. Committee on 
Character & Fitness, 373 U.S. 96 (1963) (denial of 
admission to bar); Greene v. McElroy, 360 U.S. 474 
(1959) (security clearance revocation). 
Notwithstanding the recognized importance of 
the Confrontation Clause, its scope as well as the 
values it seeks to protect remain subject to de-
bate. This result is probably attributable to two 
factors. First, as Justice Harlan has pointed out, 
"the Confrontation Clause comes to us on faded 
parchment. History seems to give us very little in-
sight into the intended scope of the Sixth Amend-
ment Confrontation Clause," California v. Green, 
399 U.S. 149, 173-74 (1970) (concurring opinion). 
See also Graham, The Right of Confrontation and 
the Hearsay Rule: Sir Walter Raleigh Loses 
Another One, 8 Grim. L. Bull. 99, 104 (1972) ("The 
historical approach is peculiarly difficult as ap-
plied to the Sixth Amendment because a satisfac-
tory history of the right of confrontation has yet to 
be written."). Second, the Supreme Court has only 
recently ventured into this area. The Court "decid-
ed its first confrontation case a century after the 
Sixth Amendment was adopted." /d. Moreover, the 
Court had little need to develop a comprehensive 
view of the right of confrontation prior to 1965, 
when the right was first applied to state trials in 
Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400 (1965). Prior to that 
time, the Court could resolve most "confrontation" 
issues on federal evidentiary grounds. 
This article will examine the current status of 
the Confrontation Clause. The first part of the arti-
cle considers the "right to be present," the right of 
cross-examination, and Bruton issues. The second 
part discusses the relationship between the right 
of confrontation and the hearsay rule. 
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PRESENCE AT TRIAL 
"One of the most basic of the rights guaranteed 
by the Confrontation Clause is the accused's right 
to be present in the courtroom at every stage of 
his trial." Illinois v. Allen, 397 U.S. 337, 338 (1970); 
accord, In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257 (1948); Lewis v. 
U.S., 146 U.S. 370, 372 (1892) ("A leading principle 
that pervades the entire law of criminal procedure 
is that, after indictment found, nothing shall be 
done in the absence of the prisoner."). See also 
Westen, Confrontation and Compulsory Process: A 
Unified Theory of Evidence for Criminal Cases, 91 
Harv. L. Rev. 567, 569-74 (1978). Thus, it is a viola-
tion of the right of confrontation for the defendant 
to be absent during challenges to the jury, lewis v. 
U.S., 146 U.S. 370 (1892), during the introduction of 
evidence, In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 370 (1948), and 
when additional jury instructions are given, State 
v. Grisafulli, 135 Ohio St. 87, 19 N.E.2d 645 (1939); 
Jones v. State, 26 Ohio St. 208 (1875). 
A recent case involving the right to be present is 
U.S. v. Benefield, 593 F.2d 815 (8th Cir. 1979). In 
Benefield a videotape deposition of the prosecu-
tion's principal witness, a kidnap victim, was taken 
prior to trial. The deposition was used because the 
witness' psychiatrist testified that her "psychiatric 
problems were directly related to her abduction. 
He recommended that she not be required to testi-
fy or that circumstances less stressful than a trial 
courtroom be arranged." /d. at 817. The defendant 
was excluded from the room in which the deposi-
tion was taken, although he did observe the pro-
ceedings on a monitor and could interrupt the pro-
ceedings by using a buzzer, at which time his 
counsel could consult with him. The Eighth Circuit 
found this procedure infringed the defendant's 
right of confrontation: 
Basically the confrontation clause contemplates the 
active participation of the accused at all stages of the 
trial, including the face-to-face meeting with the wit-
ness at trial or, at the minimum, in a deposition allow-
ing the accused to face the witness, assist his coun-
sel, and participate in the questioning through his 
counsel. /d. at 821. 
See also State v. Wilkinson, 64 Ohio St.2d 308, 415 
N.E.2d 261 (1980); Criminal Defendant Has Sixth 
Amendment Right to Physically Confr..ont Witness 
at Video-Taped Deposition, 1979 Wash. U.L.Q. 
1106. 
Waiver 
The right to be present at trial may be waived, 
either expressly or by conduct. In Illinois v. Allen, 
397 U.S. 337 (1970), the Supreme Court held that a 
defendant who disrupts a trial, making it "difficult 
or wholly impossible to carry on the trial," may be 
excluded, after warning, from the courtroom. Simil-
arly, in Taylor v. U.S., 414 U.S. 17 (1973), the Court 
held that a defendant who voluntarily absented 
himself from his trial during a recess had waived 
his right to be present. See also Diaz v. U.S., 223 
u.s. 442 (1912). 
In Taylor the defendant argued that a voluntary 
absence cannot be construed as an effective waiv-
er because it was not "an intentional relinquish-
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ment or abandonment of a known right or privi-
lege." /d. at 19, quoting Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 
458 (1938). The court rejected this argument, which 
would have required a defendant to have been ad-
vised in advance of the consequences of absent-
ing himself from trial. According to the Court, "[i]t 
is wholly incredible to suggest that petitioner ... 
entertained any doubts about his right to be pre-
sent at every stage of his trial." /d. at 20. 
Several courts have also found a "waiver" where 
the defendant absents himself prtor to trial but af-
ter arraignment. See U.S. v. Peterson, 524 F.2d 167 
(4th Cir. 1975). cert. denied sub. nom., Smith v. 
U.S., 424 U.S. 925 (1976); U.S. v. Tortora, 464 F.2d 
1202 (2d Cir. 1972), cert. denied sub. nom., Santora 
v. U.S., 409 U.S.1063 (1972). 
The right to be present has been codified in Fed-
eral Criminal Rule 43 and Ohio Criminal Rule 43. 
See generally BB Moore's Federal Practice ch. 43 
(1981); 2 0. Schroeder & L. Katz, Ohio Criminal 
Law, Grim. R. 43 (1980). See also R.C. 2945.16 
(right to be present at jury view); Grim. R. 15 (right 
to be present at deposition). 
RIGHT OF CROSS-EXAMINATION 
In addition to ensuring a defendant's right to be 
present, the Confrontation Clause guarantees the 
defendant the right to cross-examine the "witness-
es against him." See Douglas v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 
415, 418 (1965) ("Our cases construing the [Con-
frontation] clause hold that a primary interest se-
cured by it is the right of cross-examination."). 
Brookhart v. Janis, 384 U.S. 1, 3 (1966) ("a denial of 
cross-examination without a waiver ... would be 
constitutional error of the first magnitude and no 
amount of showing of want of prejudice would 
cure it."). 
Denial of Right to Cross-Examine 
The Supreme Court has reviewed several cases 
in which it has found a complete denial of the 
right of cross-examination. For example, in 
Douglas v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 415 (1965), the pro-
secution called a previously-convicted accomplice 
as a witness. When the witness refused to testify, 
asserting the privilege against self-incrimination, 
the prosecutor read the witness' prior confession 
which implicated the defendant, under the guise of 
refreshing the witness' recollection. The Supreme 
Court reversed. 
In the circumstances of this case, [the defendant's] in-
ability to cross-examine [the witness] as to the alleged 
confession plainly denied him the right of cross-exam-
ination secured by the Confrontation Clause .... Al-
though the Solicitor's reading of [the witness'] alleged 
statement, and [the witness'] refusal to answer, were 
not technically testimony, the Solicitor's reading may 
well have been the equivalent in the jury's mind of 
testimony that [the witness] in fact made the state-
ment. .. /d. at 419. 
See also State v. Liberatore, 69 Ohio St.2d 583 
(1982). 
A similar denial of cross-examination is found in 
joint trials in which one defendant's confession 
implicating a codefendant is admitted. Although 
the codefendant would be entitled to an instruc-
tion cautioning the jury to use the confession only 
in establishing the guilt of the defendant who 
made the confession, the Supreme Court has held 
that such an instruction is ineffective, and conse-
,- quently, the non-confessing defendant's right of 
confrontation is denied - at least, where the con-
fessing defendant does not take the stand. Bruton 
v. U.S., 391 U.S. 123 (1968); Nelson v. O'Neil, 402 
U.S. 622 (1971); but see, Parker v. Randolph, 442 
U.S. 62 (1979) (plurality opinion) (interlocking con-
fessions). See infra. 
Parker v. Gladden, 385 U.S. 363 (1966), illustrates 
another way in which a defendant's right of cross-
examination may be denied. In Parker a bailiff 
assigned to a sequestered jury told one juror "Oh 
that wicked fellow, he is guilty" and another juror 
"[i]f anything is wrong (in finding petitioner guilty) 
the Supreme Court will correct it." /d. at 363-64. 
The Supreme Court reversed, finding a violation of 
the right of confrontation. 
These cases can also be viewed as "hearsay" 
cases because they involve extrajudicial state-
ments that the jury probably used for the truth of 
the assertions. Indeed, the Supreme Court has 
often relied on these cases in deciding hearsay-
confrontation issues. On the other hand, these 
cases can also be viewed as "nonevidence" cases, 
situations in which the jury may have decided the 
case on evidence that was not admitted at trial. 
See Graham, The Right of Confrontation and the 
Hearsay Rule: Sir Walter Raleigh Loses Another 
~One, 8 Grim. L. Bull. 99 (1972). 
· Curtailment of Cross-Examination 
Cases recognizing a trial court's discretion in 
controlling the scope of cross-examination are 
common. E.g., O'Brien v. Angley, 63 Ohio St.2d 
159, 163, 407 N.E.2d 490, 493 (1980) ("The scope of 
cross-examination and the admissibility of evi-
dence during cross-examination are matters which 
rest in the sound discretion of the trial judge."); 
State v. Walker, 55 Ohio St.2d 208, 214, 378 N.E.2d 
1049, 1052 (1978), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 924 (1979) 
("The trial judge is posited with broad discretion in 
controlling cross-examination .... ") 
Nevertheless, there are a number of cases in 
which the Supreme Court has ruled that a defense 
counsel's cross-examination of prosecution wit-
nesses had been unconstitutionally curtailed. The 
leading case is Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308 (1974). 
Because of a state statute protecting the confiden-
tiality of juvenile adjudications, the defense in 
Davis was not permitted to elicit information about 
a key government witness' juvenile probationary 
status during cross-examination. According io ihe 
defense, the witness' probationary status raised 
the possibility of bias; that is, the witness was 
"subject to undue pressure from the police and 
made his identifications[of the defendant] under 
jJear of possible probation revocation." /d. at 311. 
"In an opinion written by Chief Justice Burger, the 
,Court held that this restriction on the scope of 
cross-examination violated the defendant's right of 
Confrontation. Although the Court recognized the 
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legitimacy of the state's protective policy concern-
ing juveniles, the Court found that the "State's 
policy interest in protecting the confidentiality of a 
juvenile offender's record cannot require yielding 
of so vital a constitutional right as the effective 
cross-examination for bias of an adverse witness." 
/d. at 320. 
The Court had addressed similar issues in two 
earlier cases. In Smith v. Illinois, 390 U.S. 129 
(1968), the defense was precluded from eliciting 
the true name and address of the prosecution's 
"principal witness" during cross-examination. The 
Court held that this limitation on cross-examin-
ation deprived the defendant of the right of con-
frontation. "To forbid this most rudimentary inquiry 
at the threshold is effectively to emasculate the 
right of cross-examination itself." /d. at 131. In 
reaching its decision, the Court relied heavily on 
Alford v. U.S., 282 U.S. 687 (1931), decided almost 
forty years earlier. As in Smith, the defense in 
Alford was not permitted to examine a government 
witness about the witness' current residence. The 
Court held that this curtailment of cross-examin-
ation, which would have apparently established 
that the witness was in federal custody, was an 
abuse of discretion and prejudicial error. 
See also State v. Faulkner, 56 Ohio St.2d 42, 46, 
381 N.E.2d 934, 936 (1978) ("a defendant must have 
the opportunity to cross-examine all witnesses 
against him as a matter of right ... ");State v. 
Hannah, 54 Ohio St.2d 84, 88, 374 N.E.2d 1359, 
1362 (1978) ("Any abrogation of the defendant's 
right to a full and complete cross-examination of 
such witnesses is a denial of a fundamental right 
essential to a fair trial and is prejudicial per se."); 
State v. Gavin, 51 Ohio App.2d 49, 365 N.E.2d 1263 
(1977). 
Fifth Amendment Limitations 
Cross-examination may be limited or completely 
cut off if a prosecution witness asserts the Fifth 
Amendment privilege against self-incrimination. 
Under these curcuinstances, the defendant's right 
of confrontation conflicts with the witness' Fifth 
Amendment right. If the asseriion of the privilege 
"precludes inquiry into the details of [the witness'] 
direct testimony, there may be a substantial dan-
ger of prejudice because the defense is deprived 
of the right to test the truth of his direct testimony 
and, therefore, that witness' testimony should be 
struck in whole or in part." U.S. v. Cardillo, 316 
F.2d 606, 611 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 822 
(1963); accord, U.S. v. Demchak, 545 F.2d 1029, 
1031 (5th Cir. 1977); U.S. v. Newman, 490 F.2d 139, 
145-46 (3d Cir. 1974). See also Douglas v. Alabama, 
380 u.s. 415 (1965). 
Striking the direct examination, however, is not 
automatic. The courts have recognized a distinc-
tion between "direct" and "collateral" matters. 
In determining whether the testimony of a witness 
who invokes the privilege against self-incrimination 
during cross-examination may be used against the 
defendant, a distinction must be drawn between 
cases in which the assertion of the privilege merely 
precludes inquiry into collateral matters which bear 
only on the credibility of the witness and those cases 
in which the assertion of the privilege prevents inquiry 
into matters about which the witness testified on di-
rect examination. U.S. v. Cardillo, 316 F.2d 606, 611 
(2nd Cir.), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 822 (1963). 
Accord, U.S. v. Williams, 626 F.2d 697, 701-02 (9th 
Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1020 (1980); Turner v. 
Fair, 617 F.2d 7, 9-11 (1st Cir. 1980). See also 3 D. 
Louisell & C. Mueller, Federal Evidence § 338 
(1979); Anno., 55 A.L.R. Fed. 742 (1981). 
The direct-collateral dichotomy, however, is an 
"often tenuous distinction." 3 J. Weinstein & M. 
Berger, Weinstein's Evidence 611-54 (1981). As one 
court has noted: 
But the line between "direct" and "collateral" is not 
clear, and the question in each case must finally be 
whether defendant's inability to make the inquiry 
created a substantial danger of prejudice by depriving 
him of the ability to test the truth of the witness' 
direct testimony. Fountain v. U.S., 384 F.2d 624, 628 
(5th Cir.), cert. denied sub. nom. Marshall v. U.S. 390 
U.S. 1005 (1968). 
Davis v. Alaska would seem to preclude the 
possibility of equating "collateral" matters with 
matters of credibility because Davis involved im-
peachment by bias, a matter of credibility. See 
U.S. v. Diecidue, 603 F.2d 535 (5th Cir. 1979), cert. 
denied sub. nom. Antone v. U.S., 445 U.S. 946 
(1980) (bias not a collateral matter). 
Another solution to the conflict between the 
defendant's right of confrontation and the witness' 
privilege against compulsory self-incrimination is 
the immunization of the witness. See Note, "The 
Public Has a Claim to Every Man's Evidence": The 
Defendant's Constitutional Right to Witness Immu-
nity, 30 Stan. L. Rev. 1211, 1228-30 (1978). There is 
some judicial support for requiring immunity in sit-
uations in which a witness' Fifth Amendment 
claim interferes with an accused's ability to de-
fend. See Government of Virgin Islands v. Smith, 
615 F.2d 964 (3d Cir. 1980); U.S. v. Yates, 524 F.2d 
1282, 1286 (D.C. Cir. 1975); State v. Broady, 41 Ohio 
App.2d 17, 321 N.E.2d 891 (1974). See generally 
Note, The Sixth Amendment Right to Have Use Im-
munity Granted to Defense Witnesses, 91 Harv. L. 
Rev. 1266 (1978); Comment, Defense Witness Im-
munity and the Right to a Fair Trial, 129 U. Pa. L. 
Rev. 377 (1980). 
Rape Shield Laws 
In recent years, most jurisdictions have adopted 
rape shield laws. See Tanford & Bocchino, Rape 
Victim Shield Laws and the Sixth Amendment, 128 
U. Pa. L. Rev. 544, 592-602 (1980) (listing 46 jurisdic-
tions). The purpose of these provisions is to pro-
tect the privacy of rape victims. This goal is 
accomplished by altering the common law rule 
which permitted the accused to introduce evidence 
of the victim's character for chastity on the issue 
of consent. See McDermott v. State, 13 Ohio St. 
332 (1862); McCombs v. State, 8 Ohio St. 643 (1858.) 
Instead of permitting the automatic admission of 
such evidence, shield laws place both substantive 
and procedural limitations on the admissibility of 
evidence of a victim's prior sexual history. 
Because these provisions may curtail a defen-
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dant's right to cross-examine the alleged victim 
and limit the admissibility of exculpatory evidence, 
a number of commentators have questioned the 
constitutionality of shield provisions-at least as 
applied in some circumstances. See Tanford & 
Bocchino, Rape Victim Shield Laws and the Sixth 
Amendment, 128 U. Pa. L. Rev. 544 (1980); Berger, 
Man's Trial, Woman's Tribulation: Rape Cases in 
the Courtroom, 77 Colum. L. Rev. 1, 52-69 (1977); 
Westen, Compulsory Process 1/, 74 Mich. L. Rev. 
191, 208-213 (1975). Indeed, the federal shield stat-
ute explicitly recognizes that the admissibility of 
evidence of a victim's prior sexual activity may be 
"constitutionally required," Fed. R. Evid. 412(b)(1). 
Constitutional attacks on the rcipe shield stat-
utes center on two Supreme Court cases. One is 
Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308 (1974). As discussed 
above, the Court in Davis held that a statute ex-
cluding evidence of a prosecution witness' juvenile 
adjudication (a type of shield law) violated the de-
fendant's right of confrontation. 
The second Supreme Court case is Chambers v. 
Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284 (1973), in which the de-
fendant was charged with the murder of a police-
man. Another person, named McDonald, signed a 
statement admitting that it was he, not Chambers, 
who fired the fatal shots. McDonald made the 
same admission to three other persons. At a pre-
liminary examination McDonald recanted, testify-
ing that he had been pressured into signing the 
statement. McDonald was called by the defense at 
Chambers' trial and his out-of-court confession 
was introduced on direct examination. On cross-
examination, the prosecution elicited the fact that 
McDonald had recanted. On redirect examination, 
the defense wanted to cross-examine McDonald as 
an adverse witness. The trial court refused to de-
clare him as adverse witness. The court also ruled 
that the defense could not introduce McDonald's 
incriminating statements made to the three other 
persons. The court's rulings were based upon two 
evidentiary rules:. the voucher rule, which pre-
cludes a party from impeaching its own witnesses, 
and the hearsay rule, which did not recognize an 
exception for declarations against penal interests. 
As the Court put it "In sum, then, this was Cham-
bers' predicament. As a consequence of the com-
bination of Mississippi's 'party witness' or 'vouch-
er rule' and its hearsay rule, he was unable to 
either cross-examine McDonald or to present wit-
nesses in his own behalf who would have discred-
ited McDonald's repudiation and demonstrated his 
complicity." /d. at 294. The Court reversed, finding 
a due process violation. Part of the Court's opinion 
rested on a confrontation analysis- that the 
state's voucher rule precluded Chambers from 
effectively cross-examining McDonald. Thus, like 
Davis v. Alaska, Chambers can be viewed as a 
case in which the Confrontation Clause prevailed 
over a conflicting state evidentiary rule. 
Despite these constitutional arguments, shield 
laws generally have been upheld. See Bell v. Har-
rison, 670 F.2d 656 (6th Cir. 1982); Pratt v. Parratt, 
615 F.2d 486, 487 (8th Cir. 1980); Rozell v. Estelle, 
554 F.2d 229 (5th Cir. 1977); 23 C. Wright & K. 
Graham, Federal Practice and Procedure 571 n. 53 
(1980) (listing cases). Nevertheless, most commen-
tators believe that "exclusion may violate the 
defendant's constitutional rights as applied in par-
-- ticular circumstances." !d. at 572. For example, in 
' State v. Gardner, 59 Ohio St.2d 14, 391 N.E.2d 337 
(1979), the Ohio Supreme Court upheld the consti-
tutionality of the Ohio rape shield statute as ap-
plied to that case. In a footnote, however, the 
Court noted: "We hasten to stress that our holding 
is limited to the particular application of R.C. 
2907.02(D) to the facts in this case. Whether the 
statute could conceivably be applied so as to ex-
clude arguably relevant evidence, we cannot now 
determine." !d. at 19 n. 2. 
A few courts have found a constitutional viola-
tion where evidence of the alleged victim's prior 
sexual history has been excluded. For example, in 
State v. Delawder, 28 Md. App. 212, 344 A.2d 446 
(1975), the defense's theory was that the alleged 
victfm, a young teenager, fabricated her testimony 
about having intercourse with the defendant be-
cause she believed that she was pregnant and was 
afraid to inform her mother of this fact. The court, 
applying Davis v. Alaska, held that the defendant's 
right of confrontation had been denied when the 
trial court precluded the defense from introducing 
evidence of the alleged victim's past sexual his-
tory to support this theory. See also State v. Jalo, 
27 Or. App. 845, 557 P.2d 1359 (1976); People v. 
Mandel, 61 App. Div.2d 563, 403 N.Y.S.2d 63 (1978). 
Other Privileges 
Whether the right of confrontation may override 
other state evidentiary privileges is a matter of 
debate. See Hill, Testimonial Privilege and Fair 
Trial, 80 Colum. L. Rev. 1173 (1980); Westen, Re-
flections on Alfred Hill's "Testimonial Privilege 
and Fair Trial," 14 U. Mich. J. L. Reform 372 (1981). 
Again, Davis v. Alaska, in which the Court held 
that the defendant's right of confrontation prevail-
ed over the privilege of confidentiality of juvenile 
court records, is the critical case. Moreover, United 
States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 (1974), co,ntains dic-
tum indicating that the Sixth Amendment, under 
some circumstances, overrides executive privilege. 
!d. at 711. 
In several cases courts have held that the right 
of confrontation prevails over conflicting statutory 
privileges. For example, in Salazar v. State, 559 
P.2d 66 (Alas. 1976), the Alaska Supreme Court 
held that the right of confrontation overrode the 
privilege for confidential communications between 
husband and wife. Similarly, in State v. Hembd, 
305 Minn. 120, 232 N.W.2d 872 (1975), the Minne-
sota Supreme Court held the right of confrontation 
prevailed over the physician-patient privilege. See 
also People v. Sumpter, 75 Misc.2d 55, 347 
N.Y.S.2d 670 (Sup. Ct. 1973) (Sixth Amendment 
Prevails over confidentiality of state agency's per-
sonnel files.); Note, Constitutional Restraints on 
the Exclusion of Evidence in the Defendant's Fa-
vor: The Implications of Davis v. Alaska, 73 Mich. 
L. Rev. 1465 (1975); Note, Defendant v. Witness: 
Measuring Confrontation and Compulsory Process 
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Rights Against Statutory Communications Privi-
leges, 30 Stan. L. Rev. 935 (1978). 
Waiver 
In Brookhart v. Janis, 384 U.S. 1 (1966), the 
Supreme Court considered the standard for deter-
mining a waiver of the right of confrontation and 
cross-examination. In Brookhart the defendant's 
counsel agreed to a procedure that is described as 
a "prima facie trial;" that is, he "agreed that the 
state need make only a prima facie showing of 
guilt and that he would neither offer evidence on 
petitioner's behalf nor cross-examine any State's 
witnesses." !d. at 7. The record indicated that the 
defendant did not fully comprehend what a "prima 
facie trial" entailed. In reversing, the Supreme 
Court wrote: 
The question of a waiver of a federally guaranteed 
constitutional right is, of course, a federal question 
controlled by federal law. There is a presumption 
against the waiver of constiutional rights ... and for a 
waiver to be effective it must be clearly established 
that there was "an intentional relinquishment or aban-
donment of a known right or privilege." Johnson v. 
Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458 .... /d. at 4. 
The Court went on to find that the defendant 
neither personally waived his constitutional right 
to confront and cross-examine the witnesses 
against him, nor acquiesced in his lawyer's at-
tempted waiver. The waiver standard adopted in 
Brookhart is a more stringent standard than the 
one adopted by the Court in the "right to be present" 
cases. See supra. 
BRUTON V. UNITED STATES 
Because the Supreme Court has decided a num-
ber of cases involving "Bruton" issues, this sub-
ject is treated separately in this section. In Bruton 
v. U.S., 391 U.S. 123 (1968), the Court considered 
the admissibility in a joint trial of the confession 
of one defendant that inculpated another defend-
ant. In such a situation, the non-confessing de-
fendant is entitled to a limiting instruction, cau-
tioning the jury to use the confession in determin-
ing only the guilt of the confessing party. Prior to 
Bruton, the Court had held that such an instruction 
was adequate to protect the non-confessing code-
fendant. Delli Paoli v. U.S., 352 U.S. 232 (1957). In 
Bruton, however, the Court held that the limiting 
instruction was not sufficient. According to the 
Court, 
there are some contexts in which the risk that the jury 
will not, or cannot, follow instructions is so great, and 
the consequences of failure so vital to the defendant, 
that the practical and human limitations of the jury 
system cannot be ignored .... Such a context is pre-
sented here, where the powerfully incriminating extra-
judicial statements of a codefendant, who stands ac-
cused side-by-side with the defendant, are deliberately 
spread before the jury in a joint trial. 391 U.S. at 
135-36. 
Once the Court concluded that there existed a 
"substantial risk that the jury, despite instructions 
to the contrary, looked to the incriminating extra-
judicial statements in determining the petitioner's 
guilt," it held that the admission of the nontestify-
ing codefendant's "confession in this joint trial 
violated petitioner's right of cross-examination 
secured by the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth 
Amendment." /d. at 126. 
In subsequent decisions, the Court held Bruton 
applicable to state trials, Roberts v. Russell, 392 
U.S. 293 (1968), and subject to the harmless error 
doctrine, Harrington v. California, 395 U.S. 250 
(1969); Schneble v. Florida, 405 U.S. 427 (1972); 
Brown v. U.S., 411 U.S. 223 (1973). See also State v. 
Moritz, 63 Ohio St.2d 150, 407 N.E.2d 1268 (1980). 
Applicability of Bruton 
There are a number of situations in which 
Bruton does not apply. First, Bruton applies only 
when the codefendant's confession is not admis-
sible against the non-confessing defendant. In a 
footnote in Bruton the Court pointed out this 
limitation: "We emphasize that the hearsay state-
ment inculpating petitioner was clearly inadmissi-
ble against him under traditional rules of evidence 
.... There is not before us, therefore, any recog-
nized exception to the hearsay rule insofar as peti-
tioner is concerned and we intimate no view what-
ever that such exceptions necessarily raise ques-
tions under the Confrontation Clause." /d. at 128 n. 
3. Thus, if the confession falls within a recognized 
hearsay exception, such as the coconspirator ex-
ception, see Fed. R. Evid. 801(d)(2)(E); Ohio R. Evid. 
801(D)(2)(e), Bruton would not apply. In such a case 
the confrontation issue is analyzed under a differ-
ent standard. See infra (hearsay). 
Second, the Bruton rationale would not appear 
to apply to bench trials. See U.S. v. Pinkney, 611 
F.2d 176, 178 (7th Cir. 1979); Cockrell v. Ober-
hauser, 413 F.2d 256 (9th Cir. 1969). Nevertheless, 
if in a bench trial the court does, in fact, use the 
confession in determining the guilt of the non-con-
fessing defendant, Bruton applies. See U.S. v. 
· Longee, 603 F.2d 1342, 1345 (9th Cir. 1979). 
Third, if the codefendant testifies at trial, Bruton 
does not apply. In Bruton the codefendant did not 
testify. See 391 U.S. 136 ("The unreliability of such 
evidence is intolerably compounded when the al-
leged accomplice, as here, does not testify and 
cannot be tested by cross-examination."). If the co-
defendant testifies, however, the defendant has 
the opportunity to cross-examine the codefendant, 
thereby obviating the confrontation issue. The 
Supreme Court took this position in Nelson v. 
O'Neil, 402 U.S. 622 (1971). See also State v. Doher-
ty, 56 Ohio App.2d 112, 381 N.E. 2d 960 (1978). The 
Nelson rationale is inapplicable where both de-
fendants are represented by the same attorney be-
cause in such a case cross-examination of the tes-
tifying codefendant would present a conflict of in-
terests. See Courtney v. U.S., 486 F.2d 1108 (9th 
Cir. 1973); Holland v. Henderson, 460 F.2d 978 (5th 
Cir. 1972). 
Fourth, there is authority for the proposition that 
Bruton is inapplicable when both defendants have 
confessed, implicating each other ("interlocking 
confessions."). The Court considered, but did not 
resolve, this issue in Parker v. Randolph, 442 U.S. 
62 (1979). The plurality opinion in Parker took the 
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position that Bruton was not applicable to cases 
involving interlocking confessions. Only four Jus-
tices, however, joined in that position. Justice 
Blackmun concurred on harmless error grounds 
and Justice Powell did not participate in the deci-
sion. The lower courts have split on the issue. See 
id. at 68 n. 4 (listing cases). 
Bruton could apply, however, to statements 
made by a codefendant in a pro se argument to a 
jury. U.S. v. Sacco, 563 F.2d 552 (2d Cir. 1977). 
Avoiding the Bruton Issue 
There are several ways in which the Bruton 
issue may be obviated. Separate trials avoid the 
problem raised in Bruton because the codefend-
ant's confession would be inadmissible hearsay in 
the trial of the non-confessing defendant. Fre-
quently, a motion to sever is based on this ground. 
See generally State v. Moritz, 63 Ohio St.2d 150, 
407 N.E.2d 1268 (1980); 8 Moore's Federal Practice 
ch. 14 (1978); 2 0. Schroeder & L. Katz, Ohio Crim-
inal Law, Grim. 14 (1980). 
Another way to avoid the Bruton issue is to 
delete or redact all references in the confession 
that relate to the codefendant. The Bruton Court 
recognized this possibility. See 391 U.S. at 134 
n.10. See also State v. Rosen, 151 Ohio St. 339, 
342, 86 N.E.2d 24, 26 (1949). This procedure is not 
effective in many cases "since other testimony in 
the case may lead any juror inevitably to the con-
clusion that omitted names in the statement can 
only be the names of other codefendants sitting at 
the defense table." 1 D. Louisell & C. Mueller, 
Federal Evidence 337 (1977). See also Parker v. 
Randolph, 422 U.S. 62, 67 n. 3 (1979); Hodges v. 
Rose, 570 F.2d 643 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 436 U.S. 
909 (1978). Thus, the California Supreme Court has 
remarked: "By effective deletions, we mean not 
only direct and indirect identifications of code-
fendants but any statements that could be employ-
ed against nondeclarant codefendants once their 
identity is otherwise established." People v. 
Aranda, 63 Cal.2d 518, 530, 407 P.2d 265, 273, 47 
Cal. Rptr. 353, 361 (1965). In addition, "the confess-
ing defendant may himself object to redaction, in-
voking the 'rule of completeness' and urging that 
deletions from his statement as read or presented 
to the jury distort the meaning of the portion of-
fered in evidence." 1 D. Louisell & C. Mueller, 
supra, at 337-38. 
Another remedy for avoiding Bruton is the em-
paneling of two juries, with only the appropriate 
jury present at the time the codefendant's confes-
sion is received. See U.S. v. Rimar, 558 F.2d 1271, 
1273 (6th Cir. 1977); U.S. v. Rowan, 518 F.2d 685, 
690 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, sub. noin. Jackson v. 
U.S., 423 U.S. 949 (1975); U.S. v. Sidman, 470 F.2d 
1158, 1167-70 (9th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 
1127 (1973). 
See generally 21 C. Wright & K. Graham, Federal 
Practice and Procedure§ 5064 (1977); 1 J. Wein-
stein & M. Berger, Weinstein's Evidence ~105[04] 
(1981); Marcus, The Confrontation Clause and Co-
defendants Confessions: The Drift from Bruton to 
Parker v. Randolph, 1979 U.lll. L.F. 559. 
